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Abstract
This paper gives an account ofAnderson andBelnap’s selection criteria for an adequate
theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining
tomodality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The
leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive
syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown
in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics which
satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria, provided the truth-constant
known as the Ackermann constant is available. One of the selection criteria related to
expressive strength is having an “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction
theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and
Belnap’s take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about
logical consequence.
Keywords Entailment · Logical pluralism · Logical theory choice · Modality ·
Paraconsistency · Relevant logics · Truth-constants
Don’t you therefore see that in this way from this impossibility, that Socrates is a
man and Socrates is not a man, anything follows?
Alexander Neckam
1 Introduction
Tradition has it that relevant logics are inherently paraconsistent; that is they don’t
license the inference from the premise set {A,∼A} to B for arbitrary A’s and B’s.
In the prequel to this paper, Non-Boolean Classical Relevant Logics I, I presented a
The quote is from ch. 173 of Neckam’s De Naturis Rerum, here requoted from Read (1988, p. 31).
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logic ′E which has both the variable sharing property, the Entailment theorem, the
enthymematical deduction theorem, as well as a definable S4 modality. The Hilbert
consequence relation of′E, however, is not paraconsistent, but explosive and therefore
validates the principles called disjunctive syllogism; the rule {A,∼A ∨ B} h B
is derivable for arbitrary A’s and B’s. ′E is quite closely related to Anderson and
Belnap’s favorite logic E. In order to prove the variable sharing property, however,
the transitivity axioms of E had to be weakened ever so slightly. As a result, its
modal features had to be added as primitive postulates. Ever since Ackermann (1956)
(who did so under inspiration from Johansson) have logicians considered adding truth-
constants to relevant logics in order to increase expressivity. This paper shows that one
can do better than ′E provided that ‘t,’ the truth-constant known as the Ackermann
constant, is admitted into the language.
Relevant logics came about as an attempt at providing a theory of entailment, that
is, logical consequence, free of the so-called paradoxes of implication. Not only, how-
ever, did they seek a new concept of entailment, Anderson and Belnap argued in their
Grammatical propaedeutic—the appendix to Anderson and Belnap (1975)—that even
though entailment belongs to the “meta-language,” this is merely a grammatical fact
with little or no significance for theorizing about logical consequence. They therefore
sought not only a new concept of entailment, but a theory of entailment in which
entailment itself was to be expressible.1 In Ackermann’s first attempt at such a condi-
tional it is clear that the conditional is added to classical logic: the →-free fragment
of Ackermann’s logic ′ is classical logic. Thus one might simply view ′ as harbor-
ing two notions of conditionality: that expressed by the material conditional and that
expressed by what Ackermann called strenge Implikation—the added connective →.
This sets Ackermann’s approach apart from that of Anderson and Belnap (A&B from
now on).
As we shall see, A&B also sought a theory of entailment with two kinds of condi-
tionals. Their favorite logicE—their “logic of entailment”—is obtained by essentially
dropping from ′ its primitive rule {A,∼A ∨ B}  B—that is modus ponens for the
material conditional, or disjunctive syllogism, named by Ackermann as simply (γ ).
Not only did A&B regard the material conditional as not expressing entailment—in
fact they acknowledged that “it is not unmistakably clear whether or not anyone ever
seriously took material implication to express ‘valid argument’ ” (Anderson and Bel-
nap 1961, p. 715)—but thought furthermore that the material conditional should not
even be viewed as a conditional: “But of course A ∨ B is no kind of conditional,
since modus ponens fails for it, as we have remarked ad nauseam before.” (Anderson
and Belnap 1975, p. 259).2 Of course, if all they intended by claiming that modus
ponens fails for the material conditional is that it fails in the case of E, that would be
rather uninteresting. What I take them to argue, however, is that the properties of any
theory of entailment are such as to rule out modus ponens holding for the material
conditional; in short, they claim that modus ponens for the material conditional fails
on broadly conceived relevant grounds. The main purpose of this paper is to show that
1 For a bit more on the prehistory of relevant logics, see Øgaard (2019, § 2).
2 Also worth quoting is the colorful remark that “ ‘[m]aterial implication’ is not a ‘kind’ of implication, or




this is not the case, not even if, to borrow A&B’s phrase,3 we bend over backward
trying to be fair to their “non-official” position and require that the theory contains all
that A&B’s theory contains, i.e. that the logic extendsE, without, of course, extending
it too much so as to loose the properties deemed valuable by A&B.
A&B never gave a systematic presentation of their selection criteria for a theory of
entailment, and so just what properties they did deem valuable is open for interpreta-
tion. In this paper I have tried to give a more systematic account of what I take to be
A&B’s selection criteria and some of the reasons at least for why they opted for these.
I have categorized the criteria into three main categories:
– modality;
– relevance properties; and
– expressive strength.
A&B thought of entailment as a modal notion and thought that modality ought to be
expressiblewithin the theory of entailment. The theory of entailment should, according
to A&B, be strong enough to express modality, but not too strong so as to trivialize the
modality, or so as to validate so-called modal fallacies. I call a theory of entailment
which satisfies these criteria modally nice. Section 2 will first define what I call the
Hilbertian consequence relation for any logic. It also shows howA&B’s favorite logics
E and R are pieced together. Section 3 then introduces the truth-constants known as
the Ackermann constant t and the Church constant  and defines the explosive logics
Æ and M. The logics Æ and M are new with this paper. Relevant logics are known
for not validating the explosion axiom A ∧ ∼A → B unrestrictedly. Note, then, that
Æ and M are obtained from, respectively, Et—E augmented by the Ackermann
and Church constants—and Rt by adding the axiom t ∧ f → A, where f =d f ∼t.
Section 4 then looks at the modal features of Et andÆ and shows how to extend them
into S5-type modal logics. Here I will properly state what I take the property of modal
niceness to be and will show that both Et and Æ are in fact modally nice. Section 5
then digresses on the topic of conservative extension. It turns out that Æ and Æ5 do
not conservatively extend E, but rather interpret, respectively, classical modal S4 and
S5. M, on the other hand, conservatively extends R. That this is so follows from the
fact that these logics are closely related toCE andCR,E andRwith Boolean negation
added.4
An adequate theory of entailment must, according to A&B, avoid the “implica-
tional paradoxes.” Such paradoxes are branded fallacies of relevance by A&B as they,
intuitively, are claims of logical entailment where the premises are irrelevant to the
conclusion. A&B presented two formal criteria to safe-guard against such paradoxes:
3 Cf. Anderson and Belnap (1975, p. 258).
4 I should also like to mention a recent novel approach to the implicational paradoxes, namely that argued
for byKerr (2019). Kerr argues that the logicKR—R augmented by A∧∼A → B (which, then, also extends
CR)—is both superior to classical logic in that it does not validate genuine implicational paradoxes such as
A → (B → A), and superior to R in that it validates disjunctive syllogism. That relevant logics generally
do not validate this rule is identified as the “most unsavoury and counterintuitive aspect of relevant logics”
(Kerr 2019, § 5). Kerr appeals to the normativity of logic in classifying A ∧ ∼A → B and A → (B → B)
as merely illusory implicational paradoxes. Kerr’s approach the problem of disjunctive syllogism is highly
interesting. Going further into issues connected to the normativity of logic, or Kerr’s distinction between
genuine and illusory implicational paradoxes is regrettably beyond the scope of this paper.
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the variable sharing property and the Entailment theorem. The first such criterion
is usually stated for logics without truth-constants. Section 6 discusses the variable
sharing property in the context of truth-constants. It is shown that Æ and M satisfy
the same variable sharing properties as Et and Rt do. In fact it is shown that the
two available suggestions for how to deal with such constants are equivalent. The
Entailment criterion is often called the use-criterion as it it was thought to ensure that
if A entails B, then every proof of B must somehow use A. A&B viewed this criterion
as necessary and sufficient for avoiding the relevant fallacies. However, it was shown
in the prequel to this paper that even though E and R do satisfy the use-criterion, so
does classical logic. The proof applies to any sufficiently strong logic in the vicinity
of E having no more rules than adjunction and modus ponens. Section 8 shows how to
slightly alter the notion of a relevant deduction so as to make the Entailment theorem
provable also for logics with disjunctive syllogism as a primitive rule.
Not only should a theory of entailment be such as to avoid the modal and relevant
fallacies, but it should have certain properties best viewed as relating to expressive
strength. I should note already now, however, that this is where I find A&B to be
the most unclear. I’ve marked out two such “effable” properties, namely having a
definable “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction theorem relative to the
Hilbert consequence relation holds, and having the property of rule normality. These
are both dealt with in Sect. 7. I both state A&B’s reasons for wanting an enthymematic
conditional and show that Æ and M are alike Et and Rt in validating the deduction
theorem with regards to the conditional A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B. It is also shown
that even though 	→ does not have this feature in Et[γ ]—Et augmented by (γ )—and
Rt[γ ], a different enthymematic conditional, namely A ↪→ B =d f A ∧ t → f ∨ B,
does. A&B stated that adding (γ ) to E “destroys practically every nice property of E”
(Anderson et al. 1992, p. 138). One such property which is left rather implicit by A&B
is that of rule normality, that any primitive rule of the theory of entailment should by
the lights of the theory itself be a true entailment. From the definition of rule normality
it will be evident that Et,Rt,Æ, and M are all rule-normal logics, but that Et[γ ] and
Rt[γ ] are not.
A&B’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment, then, do not differen-
tiate between Et(Rt) andÆ(M), and so the conclusion is that the material conditional
does not fail to be a proper conditional on, broadly conceived, relevant grounds. Even
though the main goal is in this sense negative, this paper contributes positively to the
philosophy of relevant logics and should therefore also be of interest to those who
think, for whatever reason, that modus ponens in fact fails to hold for the material con-
ditional. In addition to, to highlight some of what I’ve already stated, (i) systematizing
the adequacy criteria of Anderson and Belnap, (ii) showing that logics with (γ ) as
a primitive rule can satisfy the Entailment theorem and (iii) have an enthymematical
deduction theorem, this paper also provides a new interpretation ofA&B’s often highly
polemical and often unsystematic philosophy of logic. Relevant logics are philosoph-
ically often presented as monistic theories of logical consequence: in some cases it
is the Hilbertian consequence relation which is thought of as logical consequence,
whereas in other cases it is a different “relevant” notion of logical consequence which
is presented as the one true theory of logical consequence. As we shall see, A&B
are quite explicit on their misgivings about the Hilbertian consequence relation, and
123
Synthese
so it would stand to reason that they regarded their notion of relevant consequence
as the one true theory of logical consequence. Section 9 displays how the Hilbertian
and A&B’s version of a relevant consequence relation of Et,Et[γ ] and Æ are related
before Sect. 10suggests a philosophically unifying theory underwhich tomake, I think,
a more fruitful account of A&B’s view of logical consequence, namely as adhering
to pluralism about logical consequence, and more precisely to the type of pluralism
Hjortland (2013) calls intra-theoretic pluralism. Section 11 then finally summarizes.
Although this paper is a sequel toØgaard (2019), I’ve tried tomake it as independent
as possible so as tomake them independently readable.As a result, they dooccasionally
overlap.
2 E, R and the Hilbert consequence relation
This section defines theHilbert consequence relation of a logic and presents the axioms
and rules of the logics E and R. The following section then introduces the Ackermann
and Church constants and defines the explosive siblings of E and R, namely Æ and
M.
Every logic in this paper will be thought of as a set of axioms together with a set of
rules. Rules will be on the form Γ  A where Γ is a finite set. For each logic there are
two different consequence relations which both will be important in this paper. The
easiest one to specify is the Hilbert consequence relation for a logic:
Definition 1 (The Hilbert consequence relation) A Hilbert proof of a formula A
from a set of formulas Γ in the logic L is defined to be a finite list A1, . . . , An such
that An = A and every Ai≤n is either a member of Γ , a logical axiom of L, or there is
a set Δ ⊆ {A j | j < i} such that Δ  Ai is an instance of a rule of L. The existential
claim that there is such a proof is written Γ hL A and expressed as “there exists a
Hilbert-derivation of A from Γ in the logic L,” or more casually as “the rule Γ h A
is derivable in L.”
The notion of a derivable rule does apply to consequence relations in general.
It is, however, important to distinguish between such derivable rules from merely
admissible rules. The following definition makes this distinction clear:
Definition 2 (Admissible vs. derivable rules) A rule {A1, . . . , An}  B is derivable
for a logic L and consequence relation  just in case {A1, . . . , An}  B holds. The
rule is said to be admissible if ∅  B whenever ∅  Ai for all i ≤ n.
Definition 3 (Explosive versus paraconsistent consequence relations) A consequence
relation  is explosive just in case {A,∼A}  B holds for every A and B, and
paraconsistent if not.
Note, then, that a consequence relation may be paraconsistent, yet have the explo-
sion rule {A,∼A}  B as an admissible rule. The Hilbert consequence relation h for
relevant logics such as E and R is paraconsistent. However, Meyer and Dunn showed
in Meyer and Dunn (1969) that the rule {A,∼A ∨ B}  B is admissible for both
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hE and hR. From this it easily follows that the explosion rule is admissible for both
logics.
Definition 4 (Parenthesis conventions and defined connectives) ∨ and ∧ are to bind
tighter than →, and so I’ll usually drop parenthesis enclosing conjunctions and dis-
junctions whenever possible. The material conditional ⊃, relevant equivalence ↔,
the modal operators  and ♦, the strict conditional , and the two enthymematic
conditionals 	→ and ↪→ are defined as follows:
A ⊃ B =d f ∼A ∨ B A  B =d f (A ⊃ B)
A =d f (A → A) → A ♦A =d f ∼∼A
A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B A ↪→ B =d f A ∧ t → f ∨ B
A ↔ B =d f (A → B) ∧ (B → A)
Definition 5 (E) The following list of axioms and rules defines the logic E:
(Ax1) A → A
(Ax2) A → A ∨ B and B → A ∨ B
(Ax3) A ∧ B → A and A ∧ B → B
(Ax4) A ∧ (B ∨ C) → (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
(Ax5) (A → B) ∧ (A → C) → (A → B ∧ C)
(Ax6) (A → C) ∧ (B → C) → (A ∨ B → C)
(Ax7) (A → (A → B)) → (A → B)
(Ax8) (A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B))
(Ax9) (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C))
(Ax10) ∼∼A → A
(Ax11) (A → ∼B) → (B → ∼A)
(Ax12) (A → ∼A) → ∼A
(Ax13) ((A → A) → B) → B
(Ax14) A ∧ B → (A ∧ B)
(α) {A, A → B}  B
(β) {A, B}  A ∧ B
Lemma 1 Any logic considered in this paper will have the following derived rules:
(transitivity) {A → B, B → C} h A → C
(prefix rule) {A → B} h (C → A) → (C → B)
(suffix rule) {A → B} h (B → C) → (A → C)
(leftER) {A → (B → C), D → B} h A → (D → C)
(rightER) {A → (B → C), C → D} h A → (B → D)
Proof Left for the reader. 
As we shall see in the next section, E is a S4 type modal logic. The stronger logic
R, on the other hand, was from the outset thought of as a non-modal logic.
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Definition 6 (R)R is obtained by adding (Ax15), the axiom called assertion, to E and
deleting the then superfluous (Ax13) and (Ax14).
(Ax15) A → ((A → B) → B)
It is easy to see that the modal reading of A is lost in R since A → A is in fact
an instance of the assertion axiom. This is why A&B differentiate between entailment,
which they take to be a modal concept, and the non-modal concept of implication in
that they talk of E as a (the) logic of entailment, whereas the R is “merely” a logic of
relevant implication.
3 Introducing truth-constants and the explosive logics Æ andM
A&B’s E was obtained as a modification of Ackermann’s logic ′ from Ackermann
(1956). Ackermann augmented his logic ′ with a truth-constant, , which was to be
read das Absurde, and defined A as ∼A → . A&B then realized that A can in
fact be equivalently defined as (A → A) → A, and showed in Anderson and Belnap
(1959) that  defined this way has the modal features of a S4 modality. ′ and E
turn out to be theorem-vise identical, and so E has this feature as well. Thus  is not
needed in E for the S4modality to obtain, and so Ewas originally formulated without
truth-constants. In Anderson and Belnap (1975, § 27.1.2), however, they do consider
adding a positive variant of , namely t, to both E and R. The nice feature of doing so
is that A ↔ (t → A) becomes a theorem, and so being necessarily true and being
entailed by t turn out to be equivalent. This is a significant expressive enhancement as
E without t has no uniform way of expressing the claim that A is entailed by logic.
Definition 7 (Connective extension) If L is a logic, then L and Lt are the logics
obtained by adding to L, respectively, the following sets of axioms and definitions:
•
{
() A → 




(t1) t → (A → A)
(t2) (t → A) → A
f =d f ∼t
In Øgaard (2019) the axiom (A ∧ (∼A ∨ B)) ∧ (B → B) → B was added
to a logic slightly weaker than E. The resultant logic—′E—satisfies the variable
sharing property and so A ∧ ∼A → B is not a theorem of it. It was shown, however,
that that axiom needs further weakening if one is to add it to R without yielding
A∧(∼A∨ B) → B and A∧∼A → B. A&B noted in fact that if C is any conjunction
of axioms of R, then (A∧(∼A∨B))∧C → B fails in Belnap’s testmodel of relevance
(Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 298). They did not, however, show that the same holds
forRt; in fact, as first noted inØgaard (2017, p. 211), (A∧∼A)∧t → B, and therefore
(using distribution) (A ∧ (∼A ∨ B)) ∧ t → B is in fact validated in Belnap’s test
model. These two formulas are in fact equivalent to (Ax18) below, which are used in
defining the logics Æ and M:
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Definition 8 (Æ and M)Æ and M are hereby defined as, respectively, Et5 and Rt
strengthened by
(Ax18) t ∧ f → A.
Æ is so named since the letter naming it is formed from the letter ‘A’ for ‘Acker-
mann’ and ‘E’ for ‘entailment.’ M is so named in honor of Robert Meyer who, as I
will get back to later, argued for strengthening R with Boolean negation which turns
out to be a slightly stronger logic thanM.Æ&M are my proposals for how one could
extend E & R while keeping, as we shall see,
– in the case of Æ, the modal niceness of E
– the relevance properties, i.e. the Entailment theorem and the variable sharing prop-
erty
– the two properties pertaining to expressiveness, namely the enthymematical deduc-
tion theorem and the property of rule normality
all this while at the same time having modus ponens for the material conditional, the
rule
(γ ) {A,∼A ∨ B}  B
as a derivable rule for the consequence relation h . Note, then, that Æ and M are
explosive logics with regards to the Hilbert consequence relation: the rule {A,∼A} h
B is derivable for both logics for arbitrary A’s and B’s. Even though (γ ) is admissible
for both hE and hR (cf. Meyer and Dunn 1969), both E and R have a paraconsistent
h-relation.Æ andM, however, both extend classical logic in that every valid rule of
classical logic applies unrestrictedly to h for both Æ and M.6 In other words, then,
Æ &M preserve everything good about E & R, while validating not only the logical
truths of classical logic as E & R do, but also every classically valid rule.
The truth-constants are all undefinable in all of E, and R.  is to be thought of as
the disjunction of every formula and is interpreted as the top element in every algebra.
In Et and Æ, t should be be thought of as the conjunction of every logical truth,
whereas in R and M simply as the conjunction of every truth. The reason why R and
M’s interpretation of t is legitimate is simply that the rule {A} h t → A is derivable
for these logics. Thus for R andM one may for any sentence A infer that A is entailed
by t from the assumption that A is simply true. Thus “conjunction of every truth”
should, given that Γ is the set of premises, be read as meaning
∧{A | Γ h A}—the
conjunction of the theory generated from Γ using the Hilbert consequence relation.7
In fact, A ↔ (t → A) is a theorem of both Rt and M, and so A is equivalent to being
implied by t in these logics. In contrast, t in Et and Æ should rather be interpreted as
5 Note also that both (Ax13) and (Ax14) become derivable upon adding the two t-axioms, and so Et may
be taken as simply (Ax1)–(Ax12), (t1)–(t2) together with the rules (α) and (β).
6 See Øgaard (2019, § 4.1) for details.
7 I hasten to emphasize that the language is not infinitary and so




Fig. 1 An Æ-countermodel to {A} h t → A
∧{A | ∅ h A} since the rule {A} h t → A is not derivable in either Et or Æ, but is
merely admissible.8 That this is so follows from Øgaard (2019, thm. 1) which states
that the rule {A} h A is admissible in any →-axiomatic extension of E, together
with the fact the rule is not derivable in either ofEt orÆ as the model in Fig. 1 shows,9
together with, finally, the following lemma:
Lemma 2 ∅ hL A ↔ (t → A) where L is any extension of Et.
Proof See Routley et al. (1982, p. 409) or Mares and Standefer(2017, p. 702). 
That Et and Æ make the necessitation rule admissible, but not derivable, and that
this is so also for the rule {A} h t → A, tells in favor of interpreting  as logical
necessity and t as the conjunction of every logical truth. It is only fitting, then, that
being necessarily true should coincide with being entailed by logic itself as Lemma 2
shows.10 The next section further expands upon the modal features of Et and Æ.
4 Modal properties of Et andÆ
A&B thought of the conditional of E as itself expressing entailment. Entailment,
according to A&B, is a modal concept, and so their theory of entailment was shown
to harbor a definable S4 modal operator. In order for the definable  to legitimately
be a modal operator expressing necessity according to the theory of entailment itself,
however, or so I take A&B’s view to be, it should be the case that the S4-characteristic
axioms should themselves be provable entailment statements (cf.Anderson andBelnap
1975, §§ 5.2 & 11). Furthermore, for  to express necessity, the rule {A} h A
should not be derivable, although it should be admissible (cf. Anderson and Belnap
1975, § 21.2.2).
In addition to there being fallacies of relevance, A&B thought that there weremodal
fallacies. They regarded a proposition as being necessitive if it was equivalent to a
8 This result goes back to Ackermann (1956, p. 125).
9 All displayed models in this paper have been generated by John Slaney’s computer program MaGIC
(Slaney 1995). Such models will be depicted with a displayed ordering and matrices for at least → and ∼.
Conjunction and disjunction are to be interpreted as infimum and supremum over the displayed ordering.
Rules are regarded to hold in the model if they preserve designated values—the members of the set T —if
the premises are all evaluated to designated values, then the conclusion is also evaluated to some designated
value. I will also list how to interpret the truth-constants as well as any formula needed to make the model
a counter-model for the requisite formula/rule.
10 Note that also A&B read A not only as A being necessarily true, but also as being entailed by logic.
With regards to the formula A → A, for instance, they explicitely allow the reading “if A follows
from a law of logic, then that fact itself follows from a law of logic” (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 118).
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necessary one, that is A is necessitive if and only if it is equivalent to B for some B.
Roughly, their view was that only necessitives could stand in the entailment relation
to other necessitives; any entailment statement to the contrary amounts to, accord-
ing to A&B, a modal fallacy.11 A&B viewed entailment statements as necessitives,
but propositions expressed using only negation, conjunction and disjunction as non-
necessitives. In the formal theory of entailment, then, it should not be the case that
any formula A over the {∼,∧,∨}-fragment of the language should entail any formula
B → C . This is known as the Ackermann property.
Let’s collect A&B’s criteria for theory choice pertaining to modality into a defini-
tion:
Definition 9 (Modally nice)A logic with an entailment-operator→ ismodally nice
just in case it
– satisfies the Ackermann property relative to →,
– has a definable modal operator with the S4-characteristics expressible as →-
entailments, and
– is such as to yield the necessity rule as an admissible, but not derivable rule.
This section shows that E and Æ are alike in that both are modally nice. It is also
shown how to extend E and Æ so as to make them into S5-type modal logics.
Theorem 1 The following are all valid in Et and Æ:
(K) (A → B) → (A → B) (4) A → A
(T) A → A (N) ∅ h A ⇒ ∅ h A
(∧) A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) (N) {A} h A
Proof(K)
(1) (A → B) → ((t → A) → (t → B)) Ax8
(2) (t → (A → B)) → (A → B) t2
(3) (t → (A → B)) → ((t → A) → (t → B)) 1, 2, transitivity
(4) (t → B) → B Lemma 2
(5) (t → (A → B)) → ((t → A) → B) 3, 4, right E R
(6) A → (t → A) Lemma 2
(7) (t → (A → B)) → (A → B) 5, 6, le f t E R
(8) (A → B) → (t → (A → B)) Lemma 2
(9) (A → B) → (A → B) 7, 8, transi tivi t y, def. of 
(T) Instance of (Ax13).
(∧) This is simply (Ax14).




(1) (t → A) → ((t → t) → (t → A)) Ax8
(2) t → (t → t) t1
(3) (t → A) → (t → (t → A)) 1, 2, le f t E R
(4) A → A 3, Lemma 2&fiddling
(N) See Øgaard (2019, thm. 1).
(N) Counter-model in Fig. 1.

In the same manner as for the ordinary modal logic S4, one can now show that E
and Æ only have 14 non-equivalent modalities, namely for any formula A,
A ♦A A ♦A ♦A ♦A ♦♦A
∼A ∼♦A ∼A ∼♦A ∼♦A ∼♦A ∼♦♦A
Lemma 2 above showed that A and t → A are equivalent. We now see that the
notion of necessity at work in both Et and Æ is that of a S4 modality. One might,
however, question if this is correct. Surely, if A is logically possible, then logic will
deem that it is so by necessity. Could one, therefore, add to either of these logics to
get also the S5 principle
(5) ♦A → ♦A.
Translating this to the equivalent formula using t instead of , one gets the formula
∼(t → A) → (t → ∼(t → A)), which can be read “if it’s not the case that A
is entailed by logic, then logic entails that A is not entailed by logic. Adding (5) to
Æ does not yield M, nor does it yield R if added to E. As in ordinary modal logic,
one could equivalently add the B axiom A → ♦A which has a more natural read
to it: if A is true, then logic entails that it is not the case that ∼A is entailed by
logic. It is therefore best interpreted as a strong consistency principle. By using the
contraposition axiom it is easy to see that A → ♦A is in fact interderivable with
A → ((A → f) → f) which is an instance of the assertion axiom. Adding the full
assertion axiom, A → ((A → B) → B), is in fact equivalent to adding the modality-
trivializer A → A, which therefore punctures the modal reading of being entailed
by t, and therefore the modal character of the logics. R and M, which are obtained
by adding full assertion to, respectively, E and Æ, are therefore akin to the modally
trivial logic called Triv in Hughes and Cresswell (1996).
Definition 10 (The Brouwerian axiom) L5 is hereby defined as the logicL augmented
with
(B) A → ♦A.
Theorem 2 The necessitation rule is not derivable either E5, Et5 or Æ5.
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Proof The counter-model in Fig. 1 to the rule {A} h t → A also validates (B) as is
easy to verify, and since also A = t → A in that model, the result follows. 
At the very end of Ackermann (1956), a model for Ackermann’s logic ′ is pre-
sented which falsifies any formula A → (B → C)where B and C are arbitrary, but A
is built up solely from {∼,∧,∨}. Since E is a sublogic of Ackermann’s logic, neither
it has any theorems on this form. The defining B-axiom is on this form, and so the
property does not extend toE5. It does, however extend toÆ as the following theorem
shows:
Theorem 3 Æ has the Ackermann property, i.e. it does not have any theorems on the
form A → (B → C) for A’s over the {∼,∧,∨}-fragment of the language.
Proof It is easy to verify that t ∧ f → A holds in Ackermann’s model to be found in
Ackermann(1956, p. 127).12 
Corollary 1 E and Æ are modally nice.
5 Conservative extension results
It was shown in Øgaard (2019, thm. 5) that both Ackermann’s logic ′ as well as ′E
extend classical logic; they both validate all the logical theorems of classical logic
over the→-restricted language, but also validate every classically valid rule involving
∼,∨ and ∧. That property is easily seen to extend to the (Ax18)-logics presented
in this paper. Since Et, Æ, Et5 and Æ5 are modal logics one may wonder if these
logics extend the classical modal logics S4 and S5. This section shows first that M is
a conservative extension of R and then that Æ(Æ5) is a not conservative extension
of E(E5). The trade-off with regards to the latter result is that Æ(Æ5) turns out to
interpret S4(S5) on the most natural interpretation, where any formula A of S4(S5)
is translated to the Æ(Æ5)-formula A.13
Definition 11 (Conservative Extension) If L1 and L2 are logics over, respectively,
languages L1 and L2 such that L1 ⊆ L2, then L2 conservatively extends L1 if
∅ L1 A for every L1-formula A such that ∅ L2 A.
Theorem 4 M is a conservative extension of R.
Proof Meyer and Routley showed in (1974) that R is conservatively extended by
Boolean negation. Furthermore,R with both Boolean negation and t added—CRt—is
12 The same model is also presented (in much more accessible way) in Anderson et al (1992, § 45). It is
also easy to verify that t ∧ f → A also holds in the 10-element model used by Maksimova to strengthen
Ackermann’s result (cf. Anderson and Belnap 1975, § 22.1.1). The logic ′E of Øgaard (2019) added the
axiom (A ∧ (∼A ∨ B)) ∧ (B → B) → B to a weakened version of E and showed that it satisfies many of
E-properties treasured by A&B. No mention, however, was made of the Ackermann property. Note, then,
that Ackermann’s model, although not Maksimova’s, also satisfies (A ∧ (∼A ∨ B)) ∧ (B → B) → B and
is therefore a model for ′E as well.
13 As will be evident, one could get Æ(Æ5) to extend and not just interpret S4(S5) by simply formulating
Æ(Æ5) with a primitive  and then add A ↔ ((A → A) → A) as a separate axiom.
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a conservative extension of R (Giambrone and Meyer 1989, thm. 7). Thus if ∅ h
CRt
A, for any formula A over the logical connectives {∼,∧,∨,→}, then ∅ hR A.
Furthermore, A → t ∨ f is derivable in this logic (Øgaard 2020b, Lemma 3.3), from
which it is easy to derive (Ax18).  can in fact be defined in CR simply as p ∨ ¬p
for some propositional variable p, where ¬ is the Boolean negation. Thus if ∅ hM A,
for any formula A over the logical connectives {∼,∧,∨,→}, then ∅ h
CRt
A, and
therefore ∅ hR A. 
Mares showed in (2000) that E is not conservatively extended by Boolean negation
by showing that the extensional K-sentence (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B), for a certain
restricted class of formulas A and B, is a theorem of CE, but not of E. His result
carries over to Æ as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 5 Æ is not a conservative extension of E and neither is Æ5 a conservative
extension of E5.
Proof This follows from the proof given in Øgaard (2020a, thm. 7) of Mares’ result
that CE is not a conservative extension of E since both Æ and Æ5 are axiomatic
extensions of E for which γ , i.e. {A,∼A ∨ B}  B, is a derivable rule. 
How concerned should one be by the fact thatÆ does not conservatively extend E?
One ought to care that an extension is not conservative if one has reasons for thinking
that the original logic got everything right with regards to that part of the language.
However, if one has reasons for thinking that the original logic is incomplete, then
simply proving a non-conservativeness result may not tell against the extension as
one may have independent reasons for thinking that the surplus generated are indeed
correct principles of logic. I will not go into depth with regards to the reasons for
thinking that E is modally incomplete, save to point out that this is by far not a new
idea: noting that the extensional K-sentence fails not only for E, but also for NR—
R with a S4-modality added—Routley and Meyer (1972, p. 70) suggested (from a
suggestion by Belnap) that both these logics should be augmented by the axiom of
modal confinement, (A ∨ B) → (♦A ∨ B).14 Æ fails to validate this stronger
axiom, and so may as well be argued to be modally incomplete. Note, however, that
it does validate the enthymematical version of it, namely (A ∨ B) 	→ (♦A ∨ B).
Of course, there may be other consequences of adding (Ax18) to E, but I take it, then,
that Mares’ result does not on its own show that the non-conservativeness of Æ over
E results in something which is undesirable.
We have seen that both E and Æ are S4 modal logics, and since they extend
classical logic—theorem-wise in the case of E and inferentially in the case of Æ—
it is a welcomed fact that Æ interprets S4 in the most natural way possible, and
disappointing that E does not. Although there are translations on which Et in fact
interprets S4 exactly, these are non-direct translation. The nice feature of the direct
translation is that the theory of entailment and that of modality are connected so
14 The axiom was thus baptized in Mares (1992). The resultant logic is called R4 and is investigated in
Mares and Meyer (1992), Mares and Meyer (1993) and Mares (1993), the first of which showing that R4
conservatively extends S4 on the direct translation.
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that being necessarily true and entailed by logic are equivalent notions: that is that
A ↔ (t → A) is a logical truth.15
Ænot only extends classical logic in that every valid rule of classical logic, including
the meta-rule reasoning by cases,16 is valid in Æ, but it also interprets S4 in its
extensional fragment plus . It validates every S4 axiom expressed with → as well
as with ⊃, and makes the necessitation rule admissible yet not derivable, precisely
as it indeed should be. That Æ is not a conservative extension of E may have other
consequences than (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) being a logical theorem of Æ. Such
other consequences may prove to be undesirable. However, Mares’ result in itself does
not point to any such.
Note that (A → B) → (A ⊃ B) is a theorem of any of our logics since all logics in
this paper includes (Ax12), (A → ∼A) → ∼A. It therefore follows that ♦A ⊃ ♦A
is a theorem of both Et5 and Æ5. Since Æ interprets classical modal logic S4 and
♦A ⊃ ♦A is a theorem of Æ5, it therefore follows that that Æ5 interprets classical
modal logic S5 under the natural translation.
15 There are further reasons for insisting on the direct translation. For non-direct translations, what is
expressed is then a logical concept as this is expressed in another logic. That one logic can express a logical
concept according to some other logic can be an interesting feature, but in general it is the logical concept
according to the correct logic—modality according to the theory of entailment in the case of Et—which is
the concept that we want to give a theory of. At least A&B thought that S4 gave an incorrect account of
entailment, but a correct account of modality where it only to be expressed using E’s notion of entailment
and not the strict implication of S4 (cf. Anderson and Belnap 1975, §§ 2&11). Meyer (1970) showed that E
interprets S4 on two different translations. For our purposes, let’s focus on Meyer’s result pertaining to Et.
Meyer uses the fact that S4 can be axiomatized as Et strengthened by A → (B → B), where → is then the
strict implication more commonly designated by the fish-hook and S4’sA =d f t  A. The translations
translate∼,∧ and∨ homophonically,while one usesAckermann’s translation τ(A  B) = A∧∼B∧t → f,
whereas the other uses Meyer’s weak enthymematic translation σ(A  B) = A ∧ t → f∨ B. As shown in
the “Appendix”, τ(A  B) and σ(A  B) are interderivable in Et, although they are not equivalent and so
τ and σ amount to different translations. Ackermann (1958) used τ to show that ′ (extended with a truth
constant corresponding to f) interprets at least all of Lewis’ logic S2. Meyer’s proofs, then, shows that it
interprets all of S4 in the sense that hS4 A if and only if hEt τ(A) if and only if 
h
Et
σ(A). To see that
being necessarily true in the -sense of this, and being entailed by logic are not equivalent notion, note
that τ  p and σ  p are equivalent, but that τ  p → (t → p) is not a logical truth of Et. As a further
example of how different being S4-necessarily true under σ and τ are different from that of , note that
neither τ  p → p, nor τ  (p → q) → (τ  p → τ  q) are logical truths of Et either (MaGIC easily
provides a counter-models; I leave it as exercises for the reader). I would like to thank one of the referees for
pressing this issue. Both Ackermann’s τ and Meyer’s σ are interesting as it turns out (see the “Appendix”
for proofs) that
{A} h
Et[γ ] B ⇐⇒ ∅ 
h
Et[γ ] A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → f ⇐⇒ ∅ 
h
Et[γ ] A ∧ t → f ∨ B.
16 That reasoning by cases holds forÆ (andM) follows easily from the enthymematical deduction theorem
to be proven in Sect. 7.
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6 Variable sharing for logics with truth-constants
The variable sharing property was put forward in Belnap (1960a) as a way to spell out
the requirement of relevance between antecedent and consequent in a logically true
conditional:
Confining our attention to propositional logic, a partial solution becomes almost
obvious once we note that in propositional logic, commonality of meaning is
carried by identity of propositional variables. Thus, for A to be relevant to B in
the required sense, a necessary condition is that A and B have some propositional
variable in common. (Belnap 1960a, p. 144)
Definition 12 (Variable sharing property) A logic L without truth-constants has the
variable sharing property just in case for every formula A and B,∅ L A → B
only if A and B share a propositional variable.
The variable sharing property does, by definition, not apply to logics with truth-
constants. Even if one were to change the definition of the property so as not to exclude
logics with truth-constant by default, such logics seem to blatantly violate any notion
of variable sharing as, for instance, the following formulas are all theorems of even
Et:
(a) A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ f
(b) t → B ∨ ∼B
(c) A → 
(d) A ∧ (A → ⊥) → B
Both t and  are quite freely made use of by relevant logicians and so the question
arises if the variable sharing property can in any legitimate sense be extended to cover
logics with t and . There are two suggestions in the literature for how to address
this question. The most common practice is to ascribe the variable sharing property
to any logic just in case the property holds for all constant free formulas. This is, for
instance, how the variable sharing property is stated in Galatos et al. (2007, p. 253).
Definition 13 (Constant-weak VSP) A logic L has the constant- weak variable
sharing property just in case for every truth-constant free formula A and B, ∅ hL
A → B only if A and B share a propositional variable.
Theorem 6 Et,Æ,Rt andM, all have the constant-weak variable sharing property.
Proof This follows by noting that all the axioms and rules of M, and therefore all the
three other logics as well, hold true in Belnap’s test-model for relevance.17 
The another approach to the variable sharing property for logics with truth-con-
stants, was presented in Yang (2013). Yang’s idea, developed, according to himself,
from an idea of Beall and Restall (2005), is that one should not simply disregard the
presence of the truth-constants, but rather demand that variable sharing should occur
under the intended interpretation of the truth-constants.
17 See Øgaard (2019, thm. 3) for more details).
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Definition 14 (Constant-strong VSP) A logic L has the constant- strong vari-
able sharing property just in case for every truth-constant free formula A and
B, ∅ hL A → B only if either A and B share a propositional variable, or they do so
in light of the intended interpretation of t and  as, respectively, the conjunction of
every logical truth and the disjunction of every sentence.
(a) does not violate this strong variable sharing property since t, being the con-
junction of every logical truth, has A → A as one of its conjunctions, and so
A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ f shares a propositional variable in light of the interpretation of
t.18 The same type of explanation goes for (b)–(d). Now consider an instance of
(Ax18) with A as the consequent—t ∧ f → A. Since t is the conjunction of every
logical truth, it will have A → A as one of its conjunctions, and so the antecedent
and consequent share a propositional variable Futhermore, just as neither A →  nor
 → A violates the constant-strong variable sharing property, nor does t → A. It
therefore seems hard to distinguish these two variants of the variable sharing property.
Indeed the following theorem shows that they are equivalent.
Theorem 7 The constant-weak and constant-strong variable sharing properties are
coextensive.
Proof Having the constant-strong property obviously entails having the constant-weak
one. Assume that L is a logic which has the constant-weak variable sharing property
and let A → B be any logical theorem of L. Now if t or  are subformulas of A
(B), then since every formula p → p is part of the intended reading of both t and ,
A (B) will contain every propositional variable on the intended reading of the truth-
constants, and so will share at least one with B (A). If neither truth-constants occur in
A → B then as the logic has the constant-weak variable sharing property it follows
that A and B actually share a propositional variable. 
So both Æ and M have the same variable sharing properties as the paraconsistent
siblings Et and Rt. This is far from trivial as it is quite easy to extend a logic with
axioms for a truth-constant in such a way as to make the logic loose its variable sharing
property; one could, for instance, add → (A → A) toE which on its own does not
violate the variable sharing property, but which begets the theorem B → (A → A)
which evidently does.
Meyer famously wanted to extend R with Boolean negation, ¬, to CR, and argued
that the fact that one may do so conservatively, shows that the extension is legitimate
(Meyer 1974).CR is simplyR strengthened by the two Boolean axioms A∧¬A → B
and A → B ∨¬B. CR, however, only has the variable sharing property provided one
restricts this to the Boolean-free fragment. As we have seen in this section, no such
restriction is needed in the case of either Æ, Æ5 or M beyond the clauses needed to
wiggle room for the truth-constants; wiggling one has to do also in the case of Et,
E5t and Rt.
18 Yang describes t as the conjunction of every truth. This is appropriate for Rt since A ↔ (t → A) is a




Just as constant-enriched relevant logics such as M satisfy a constant-weak vari-
able sharing property, Boolean relevant logics such as Meyer’s CR satisfy a ¬-weak
variable sharing property. One might therefore wonder if there is also a corresponding
¬-strong variable sharing property? One could, as mentioned in Restall (1999, fn. 18),
argue that there is an implicit ⊥ lurking in the Boolean negation of A; A ∧ ¬A → B
might not violate the variable sharing property just as neither A∧(A → ⊥) → B does.
This might be possible, but such an interpretation should then be independently justi-
fiable, and ought to differentiate between ¬A and A → ⊥ since these two negations
are not equivalent even in CR. The truth-constants, on the other hand, have natural
interpretations which are justifiable independent of concerns over variable sharing.
7 Enthymemes, deduction theorems and rule normality
This section discusses A&B’s view of two criteria for theory choice, namely having
an enthymematic conditional for which a deduction theorem holds, and having the
property of rule normality. These properties are not intended as relevance-properties,
but rather as more general adequacy-conditions on a theory of logical consequence. It
is shown thatÆ andM satisfy both these criteria in the same manner as Et andRt do.
The logics Et[γ ] andRt[γ ]—Et andRt with (γ ) added as a primitive rule—however,
are not rule normal. It is shown, however, that even though they do not satisfy the
enthymematical deduction theorem with regards to the conditional 	→, one can define
a different conditional for which a deduction theorem is provable.
In Øgaard (2019, thm. 7–8) I showed that the logic ′E has the following two
deduction theorems:
Γ ∪ {A} h
′E B ⇐⇒ Γ h′E A ⊃ B{A1, . . . , An} h′E B ⇐⇒h′E
∧
i≤n Ai ∧ Axioms → B
Axioms here is some finite conjunction of axioms of the logic in question. The first
does not hold for eitherE andR since disjunctive syllogism, i.e.modus ponens for⊃, is
not derivable in these logics, although the theorem does hold if this rule is added. That
the latter holds for E andR is well known. Inspecting the proofs in Øgaard (2019) will
easily convince the reader that both also apply toÆ andM. However, without t, there
is no way of replacing Axioms uniformly by a particular formula. Using t, however,
we can define the enthymematic conditional 	→, where A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B, for
which a uniform deduction theorem holds:
Theorem 8 (t-enthymematic deduction theorem) Let L be any axiomatic extension of
Et for which the rule {A} h t → A is at least admissible, then




Proof The proof is given in detail in the “Appendix”. A sketch of the proof was to my
knowledge first given in Meyer (1970, p. 183). 
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Fig. 2 Counter-model the to
enthymematic deduction
theorem for Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ]
Corollary 2 The t-enthymematic deduction theorem holds for all of Et, E5t, Rt, as well
as their -extension, and Æ, Æ5 and M.
Notice that the t-enthymematic deduction theorem can’t be liberalized to read
Γ ∪ {A} hL B ⇐⇒ Γ hL A 	→ B
since the rule {A} h t → A is only assumed to be admissible. Reading the proof
carefully, however, it is easily seen that if the rule is derivable, then the theorem can
be so liberalized. We therefore have the following:19
Corollary 3 The liberalized t-enthymematic deduction theorem holds for Rt, Rt and
M.
I noted above that adding (γ ) to E or R suffices for yielding the ⊃-deduction
theorem. However, just as the Axioms-variant of the deduction theorem fails for both
E or R with (γ ) added as shown in Øgaard (2019, thm. 8), so does the t-enthymematic
deduction theorem fail for both Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ]:
Theorem 9 The t-enthymematic deduction theorem fails for both Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ]
Proof Note that both these logics validate the rule {f} h A. The model in Fig. 2 is
a model for Rt[γ ] in which t is assigned the value 2. The model, however, fails to
validate (Ax18)—t ∧ f → A is assigned 0 when A is assigned to 0—and therefore
shows that the enthymematic deduction theorem fails for both logics. 
In discussing Ackermann’s logic ′, Anderson et al. (1992, § 45.2) note that it can
in fact be axiomatized as E[γ ].20 With regards to (γ ) , then, they note that the
addition of (γ ) as a primitive to E destroys practically every nice property E
has. […]Most of the metalogical proofs are by induction on the length of formal
proofs in E, and, in the absence of A&(A ∨ B) → B, there is apparently no way
of getting over the inductive step where (γ ) is used.
This fact led to the observation that, if A&(A ∨ B) → B does not belong in a
theory of entailment, which it obviously (by this time) does not, then the primitive
rule (γ ) does not belong there either. (Anderson et al. 1992, pp. 138f)
19 The following theorem was first proven in Meyer et al. (1974) for the first-order version ofRt. See Dunn
and Restall (2002, p. 20f) for more on deduction theorems in relevant logics and for historical references.
20 ′ is sometimes presented as having the rule A → (B → C), B  A → C as a primitive rule. This
rule, called (δ) by Ackermann, was restricted to instances where B is a logical theorem. (δ) thus restricted
holds also in E. See Øgaard (2019, § 3) for details. To avoid confusion, however, I will stick to ‘E[γ ].’
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It is rather unclear what these “nice” properties of E are. Note first of all that it
follows fromMeyer and Dunn (1969)’s proof that (γ ) is admissible not only in E and
R, but also in Et and Rt. Thus for all these logics it is the case that ∅ hL A if and
only if ∅ hL[γ ] A. We shall see in the next section that A&B’s notion of entailment
viewed as a consequence relation can be modified every so slightly so as to yield the
Entailment theorem provable also for Et[γ ] andRt[γ ], as well as their t-free variants.
Thus the Entailment theorem is not one of the “nice” properties. Nor is the variable
sharing property a “nice” property seeing as it is even noted in Belnap (1960a, fn. 3)
that it holds for ′. It seems, then, that the only “nice” property that Et has, but which
Et[γ ] does not, is the enthymematical deduction theorem.
Note, then, that both Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ] satisfy an alternative form of the
enthymematic deduction theorem. According to Bimbó and Dunn (2018), Maksimova
proved in her 1966 Russian articleFormal deductions in the calculus of rigorous impli-
cation (Maksimova 1966) that
Γ ∪ {A} hE[γ ] B ⇐⇒ Γ hE[γ ] A ∧ Pn → (∼Pn ∨ B),
where Pn is the conjunction of every p → p such that the propositional variable
p occurs in Γ ∪ {A} and Γ consists only of →-formulas. Meyer defined in Meyer
(1970) the enthymematic conditional ↪→, where A ↪→ B =d f A ∧ t → f∨ B. Using
Maksimova’s idea andMeyer’s enthymematic conditional, then, we state the following
result:
Theorem 10 (t/f-enthymematic deduction theorem) Let L be any axiomatic extension
of Et[γ ] for which the rule {A} h t → A is at least admissible, then




Proof The proof is given in the “Appendix”. 
Corollary 4 (t/f-enthymematic deduction theorem) Let L be either Et or Rt, then












The result now follows using Theorem 10. 
The bibliography of Anderson et al. (1992) lists the mentioned article by Maksi-
mova, although her result is not mentioned in either Anderson and Belnap (1975) or
Anderson et al. (1992). They do, however, discuss a conditional quite closely related
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to ↪→. Note, first of all, that it is not only the material conditional which is regarded as
“no kind of conditional”; also the strict conditional of S4, A  B =d f (∼A ∨ B),
fails to be a proper conditional, according to A&B, since, again, modus ponens fails
for it (cf. Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 260). Interestingly, though, they do accept
that if only S4 is formulated with primitive, then its positive fragment, S4+, harbors
a proper conditional. Similarly, they do accept that the intuitionist conditional is a
proper conditional. These conditionals fall short of representing entailment since they
do validate implicational paradoxes—for instance A  (B  B) is a logical truth of
both intuitionist logic and S4+ (where  is, respectively, the intuitionistic and strict
conditional).21 Although shy of being entailment conditionals, these conditionals are
regarded by A&B as enthymematical conditionals. Such conditionals can be regarded,
according to A&B, as representing if …then __-locutions of natural language. They
are not, however, to be read as that A entails that B, which is A&B’s preferred reading
of the E-formula A → B (cf. Anderson and Belnap 1975, A5), but rather as that A∧r
entails that B, where r is some true statement:
the “if …then __” proposition corresponding to any enthymematic argument is
true if and only if there is a (suppressed) premiss which is true and which would
convert the enthymeme into a valid argument. (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 50)
The intuitionist conditional, according to A&B, allows one to “suppress” any such
merely true r , whereas S4 allows one to suppress any necessarily true r . I will in the
following only focus on so-called strict enthymemes, and thus disregard the intuitionist
conditional.
A&B rendered —the strict conditional—in E using propositional quantifiers.
Thus they define A  B as ∃r(r ∧ (r ∧ A → B)). A&B note that the fragment of
E augmented with propositional quantifiers—E∀∃p—which contains formulas using
only ∧ and ∨ as well as the defined connective, “exactly coincides with the positive
fragment of Lewis’s system S4 of strict implication” (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 52). The
reason, they claim, that one has to restrict to the positive fragment is that S4 validates
the “irrelevant” theorem A ∧ ∼A  B:
Ifwe tried to explain away thismodal curiosity by treating it as a strict enthymeme
in E∀∃p in the sense given above, it would come to
∃r(r&(r&A&∼A → B)),
which has a decidedly irrelevant appearance in E∀∃p […].
We can, however, find a different strict enthymematic “implication” that does
the job of embedding all of S4, including its negation, in E∀∃p: we can show
that defining A  B by
∃r(r&(r&A → B ∨ ∼r))
catches all and only the theorems of S4 in E∀∃p. This result of Meyer […] is
not, however, as interesting as the foregoing positive result in relation to our
21 In fact S4+ is theorem-wise identical to the positive fragment of E augmented by A → (B → B).
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particular project, because this second account of the hook is given in terms
of only and “implication” and not an implication: in absolute contrast to our
positive enthymematic implications, it would be as much a fallacy to suppose
that detachment held for the definiens displayed above as it would be to suppose
that detachment held for material “implication”. (Anderson et al. 1992, p. 53)
The work by Meyer A&B referred to was Meyer (1970). In it, Meyer showed both
that A&B’s official definition of  can be rendered using the Ackermann constant,
namely as A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B, and that the strict enthymematic “implication”
can be rendered using ↪→.
Notice first of all that even though one might agree with A&B that
∃r(r&(r&A&∼A → B))
may look like a statement which amounts to a relevant fallacy, looks can be deceiving.
Rendering it using 	→ yields A ∧ ∼A 	→ B which is a logical theorem of Æ and Æ
satisfies, or so this paper tries to show, every relevant property that Et does.
With regards to ↪→, note that A&B’s comments amounts to reject that modus
ponens holds for it, although I take their comment to imply that they regard 	→ to
be a conditional for which modus ponens holds. That is, the argument from A and
A 	→ B to B is valid, according to A&B. However, the sense in which it is valid
is itself enthymematic: (A ∧ (A 	→ B)) 	→ B is a logical truth of Et, although
(A ∧ (A 	→ B)) → B is not. Just after noting that “A ∨ B is no kind of conditional,
since modus ponens fails for it, as we have remarked ad nauseam before,” A&B go on
[t]o console the reader who thinks we have gone completely out of our minds
we note that there is a connective, namely the enthymematic implication of § 35,
for which both the Official deduction theorem and modus ponens holds.22 The
existence of such an “if …then —,” one which we have often used in this book,
and indeed one could hardly get along without (think of what it would be like
always to state all the premisses for your argument), probably accounts, in part,
anyway, for the attractiveness of the view that the Official deduction theorem
has something to do with “if …then —.” (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 259)
I take it, then, that A&B do regard having at least one conditional for which an
enthymematic deduction theorem holds is of utmost importance. It is, however, impor-
tant to note that A&B nowhere indicate that having such a conditional is itself to be
viewed as a relevance criterion. Rather, I suggest, that it be viewed as an adequacy
criterion on the theory of entailment pertaining to expressive strength. In light of Mak-
simova’s result for Et[γ ] and the t-version of it provided here, it seems that Et[γ ] and
Rt[γ ] do satisfy A&B’s requirement of having an enthymematic conditional seeing
as ↪→ has exactly the same properties in Et[γ ](Rt[γ ]) as 	→ has in Et(Rt). It seems,
then, that having a conditional for which the enthymematical deduction theorem holds
isn’t a “nice” property either.
22 A&B uses the term “Official deduction theorem” for a deduction theorem such as the enthymematical
one, although they state it as merely the left-to-right half of what I have done.
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There is, however, one “nice” property that Et(Rt) has, but which Et[γ ](Rt[γ ])
lacks, namely rule normality:
Definition 15 (Rule normality) A logic L satisfies rule normality just in case for
every primitive rule {A1, . . . , An}  B of L, ∅ hL A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An → B
Note, then, thatÆ andM also satisfy this “nice” property, but thatEt[γ ] andRt[γ ] do
not. The criterion of rule normality can be found in Belnap (1960b, p. 12).23 Belnap
lists this property as one of in total ten “mandatory” conditions on an adequate theory
of entailment. One can, however, only speculate as to Belnap’s reason for demanding
rule normality as he never gives an argument for why it is mandatory. Note, then, that
rule normality is not explicitly stated as a general requirement in either Anderson and
Belnap (1975) or Anderson et al. (1992). Rule normality is mentioned in Anderson
and Belnap (1975) in connection with the necessitation rule. A&B think that the rule
{A}  A should in the case of E be admissible for the consequence relation h .
Many modal logics are formulated with a primitive admissible rule, something like
∅ h A ⇒ ∅ h A. A&B, however, say that such a “non-normal [rule], in the
sense that the corresponding implication A → A is not a theorem, […] [yields a
system which] lacks elegance.” (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 117). They even liken
having such a primitive admissibility rule of necessity to having simply A → A as
a theorem:
Both courses are equally odious, the latter because it destroys the notion of
necessity, and the former because, if A → A is neither true nor a theorem,
then we ought not to have — in a coherent formal account of the matter — a
primitive rule to the effect that A does after all follow from A. (Anderson and
Belnap 1975, p. 235)
This latter quote, then, seems to indicate that A&B did accept rule normality as a
selection criteria.24 Undoubtedly, however, rule normality does not either belong in
the category of relevance-properties, although it may very well be listed as a more
general adequacy condition on a theory of entailment seeing as it yields that every
primitive rule yields a true entailment. Even if it is deemed a necessary condition for
an adequate theory of entailment as A&B seem to think, however, such a theory need
not rule the material conditional a conditional non grata seeing as both Æ and M are
rule normal.
We have in this section seen that the enthymematical deduction theorem holds for
Æ andM in precisely the samemanner for which it holds forEt andRt, namely where
the deduction theorem is stated using 	→, where A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B. This, we
saw, was not the case for Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ]. However, we saw that these logics do
have an enthymematical deduction theorem only relative to a different enthymematic
conditional, namely the conditional A ↪→ B =d f A ∧ t → f ∨ B. We saw that A&B
did acknowledge 	→ as a proper conditional, but that they denied that ↪→was a proper
conditional on account of it, like thematerial conditional, didn’t satisfymodus ponens.
23 Which is a modified version of Belnap’s Doctoral Dissertation.
24 See also Routley et al. (1982, pp. 256f) where this same charge is made. See Humberstone (2010, § 2)
for a more in depth discussion of A&B’s view of the necessitation rule.
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Note, then, that modus ponens holds for ↪→ if and only if it holds for the material
conditional. Modus ponens does not hold for the material conditional in E; however,
this section has made it clear that ruling the material conditional to be “no kind of
conditional” (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 259) using either the requirement of an
enthymematic deduction theorem, or rule normality, is unfounded. The next section
looks into the use-criterion for relevance, that, intuitively, A does not entail B unless
any proof of B from A must use A. We will see that neither it can be used to rule the
material condition a non-conditional.
8 The Entailment theorem
We have so far seen that Æ and M have the same variable sharing property as Et
and Rt do. The other relevance property presented by A&B was meant to capture
a notion of premise use, that the conclusion ought to follow from the premisses; the
thought being roughly that if the conclusion follows without using the premises, then
it doesn’t really follow from them. This notion of following from is not captured in
the Hilbertian notion of logical consequence: even for logics like E it is the case that
B → B follows logically from an arbitrary formula A: {A} hE B → B.
As mentioned in the introduction, A&B sought to find not only a new entailment-
conditional, but one such which could be read as expressing a new notion of logical
consequence altogether: the consequence relation called entailment by A&B and
which their entailment-conditional → was meant to express. Since, however, the
consequence relation is definable for logics which are not thought of as expressing
entailment—the conditional of R, for instance, is rather to be thought of as a demoal-
ized version of E’s → expressing rather a contingent notion of logical consequence
referred to as simply relevant implication—I will rather call the consequence relation
relevant.25
Given any conditional  and a consequence relation 	 relating, as the Hilbertian
one does, sets of formulas to single formulas, one may define a new consequence
relation 
 simply by letting Γ 
 B if and only if there exists a set {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ Γ
such that ∅ 	
∧
i≤n Ai  B. This is, in effect what A&B did in trying to tease out
a notion of use of premises. Their notion of a relevant consequence relation is as
follows:
Definition 16 (The relevant consequence relation) A relevant deduction of a for-
mula A from a set of formulas Γ in the logic L having only modus ponens, (α), and
adjunction, (β), as primitive rules, is defined as a Hilbert proof A1, . . . , An of A from
Γ such that it is possible to mark the Ai ’s with #’s according to the following rules:
1. If Ai ∈ Γ , then Ai is marked.
2. If Ai is obtained from A j and Ak using modus ponens, then Ai is marked if either
or both of A j and Ak are marked.
3. Adjunction is only used on premises which are either both marked or both
unmarked.




4. If Ai is obtained from A j and Ak using adjunction and both of A j and Ak are
marked, then Ai is marked.
5. No other formulas are marked.
6. As a consequence of (1–5), An is marked.
The existential claim that there is such a proof is written Γ rL A and expressed as
“there exists a relevant derivation of A from Γ in the logic L.”
A&B’s so-called Entailment theorem states that




This property was regarded by A&B as necessary and sufficient for avoiding what
theydeemed to be relevant fallacies. I showed inØgaard (2019, thm. 9) that the property
also holds for the explosive logic′E. As there pointed out, however, the property holds
for virtually any logic with nomore primitive rules thanmodus ponens and adjunction,
and so even classical logic has this property. Having the Entailment theorem, therefore,
cannot be regarded as a sufficient property if the variable sharing property is, as A&B
thought, a necessary property for avoiding the paradoxes of implication.
The proof of the Entailment theorem in Øgaard (2019) is easily seen to hold for
Æ and M. It does not, however, extend to logics with other primitive rules than
adjunction and modus ponens for → for the simple reason that such logics are ruled
out by definition. Thus relevant consequence is simply not defined forEt[γ ] andRt[γ ]
using A&B’s notion of entailment. It is, however, easy to modify the definition of a
relevant deduction so as to cover also these two logics: first of all, the rule-restriction
must be lifted so as to allow for (γ ). Secondly, we update the #-rules so as to include
– (γ ) is only used on unmarked premises
– If Ai is obtained using (γ ), then Ai is unmarked.
This, then, is in effect to limit the application of (γ ) to logical theorems. Since,
however, (γ ) is admissible in Et and Rt, an easier option is in fact to simply outlaw
any application of (γ ). Either way, however, using the same type of proof as in Øgaard
(2019, thm. 9) it follows that the Entailment theorem also holds for Et[γ ] and Rt[γ ].
All the h-explosive logics Et[γ ],Rt[γ ],Æ andM, then, satisfy the use-criterion for
relevance, namely the Entailment theorem:
Corollary 5 For L ∈ {Et[γ ],Rt[γ ],Æ,M},




Øgaard (2019) tentatively suggested that there is nothing more substantial to rele-
vant logics than satisfying the variable sharing property. One of the reasons given for
this was that the Entailment theorem as stated by A&B only applies to logics having
only modus ponens and adjunction as primitive rules. As it is not evident how it can be
modified to cover logics with other rule-sets, demanding that the Entailment theorem
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should hold, then, seemed to exclude a wide range of logics from consideration too
hastily. Note, then, that even if it is upheld as a necessary relevance property, that will
not necessarily rule logics with an explosive h-relation irrelevant, not even logics
with modus ponens for the material conditional as a primitive rule.26
9 The two consequence relations relations of Et, Et[] andÆ
We have seen that → and the enthymematic conditional 	→ represent different conse-
quence relations. I mentioned in Sect. 7 that in the case of Et, modus ponens holds for
	→ only enthymematically. This, then, translates to the fact that {A, A 	→ B} r
Et
B,
although {A, A 	→ B, t} r
Et
B. Thus if t—that is the full might of the logical
resources entrusted to the logical axioms—might be called upon unrestrictedly, then
modus ponens holds for 	→. If, as is generally the casewithr forEt,Et[γ ],Rt,Rt[γ ],
Æ andM, however, one can not always conjure up t as a logically unrestricted resource,
then modus ponens does not hold for 	→ seeing as B fails to be relevantly derivable
from A and A 	→ B.
Relevant logics are often motivated as being able to support inconsistent theories
non-trivially. Note, then, that it is the presence of these two consequence relations—
h and r—that allow logics likeÆ to non-trivially support inconsistent theories, yet
insist that there is something amiss with inconsistency. Such theories can indeed be
closed under r , but cannot without trivializing be closed under h . Note, then, that if
a set of formulas is closed under r , and contains every logical truth of Æ, then it is
also closed under h . Inconsistent r -theories, then, cannot, according toÆ, be what
is called regular theories, that is they cannot contain all the logical theorem—every
A such that ∅ h A. Sometimes it is impertinent to use the Hilbertian consequence
relation, as, for instance, when reasoning with counterpossibles; A∧∼A is, according
to Æ, necessarily false, yet it is not the case that any conditional with A ∧ ∼A as
antecedent is vacuously true.Nor is it the case that anyold contradiction entailwhatever
on just any reading of ‘entails.’ Quite the contrary, in general it is not the case that
B is entailed, given the relevant notion of entailment as relevant deducibility, from a
contradictory set of premises seeing as it is not always the case that {A,∼A} r B.
Sometimes, however, one ought to, to paraphrase Achilles (cf. Carroll (1895, p. 280)),
let Logic take you by the throat, and force you to accept the conclusion. The forcing
does not happen by the might of the premises alone—not always at least—rather it
is the premises together with the logical resourses available that conjointly force the
conclusion. In this sense it is the case, say Æ, that {A,∼A, t} r B, since t is to be
interpreted as the combined resources of pure logic. (A ∧ ∼A) ∧ t is also necessarily
false, yet any conditional having it as antecedent is vacuously true according toÆ.Æ
26 A&B’s notion of a relevant consequence was generalized in Brady (1993, thm. 3) to cover relevant logics
contained in T and extending the weak logic B augmented by the axiom A ∧ (A → B) → B. Still, this
does not cover the important class of contractionless relevant logics. However, I’ve recently managed to
generalize the theorem to cover any extension of B (and even weaker logics still). Details are in Øgaard




can, therefore, also differentiate between counterpossibles and between two different
notions of consequence.
Note, then, thatÆ (and similarly forM) is a quite different logic than its explosive
sibling Et[γ ]. The latter logic can non-trivially support inconsistent yet regular the-
ories since it is not the case that {A,∼A, t} r
Et[γ ] B. Using the t/f-enthymematical
deduction theorem and the Entailment theorem, however, the only thing that we can
infer from such inconsistent theories is that f∨ B belongs to it: if both A,∼A and t are
members of Γ and this set is closed under r
Et[γ ], then seeing as {A,∼A} hEt[γ ] B if
and only if∅ h
Et[γ ] A∧∼A∧t → f∨ B (Theorem 10), using the Entailment theorem
yields that {A,∼A, t} r
Et[γ ] f ∨ B. Since (γ ) is an admissible rule in Et, it follows
that closing a set of formulas under r
Et[γ ] yields the same theory as closing under
r
Et
. To further explain just how different Æ is with regards to inconsistent regular
theories, note that A ∧ t → f∨ B is interderivable with A ∧∼B ∧ t → f in Et.27 Thus
an inconsistent and regular set of formulas will if closed under r
Et[γ ] or rEt contain
the logical falsehood f, but it can very well be the case that the theory is non-trivial.
Lastly, note that this latter fact set Et[γ ] apart from bothÆ- and Et: for the latter two
logics it is the case that any regular relevant theory—a set of formulas containing all
the axioms and closed under r—will also be closed under h . Not so for regular and
relevant Et[γ ]-theories which then need not be closed under its primitive rule (γ ).
10 Pluralism on the cheap
We have seen how Anderson and Belnap wanted a new theory of entailment, one
in which entailment itself was expressible using an object-language conditional. In
addition to this, however, they thought that such a theory should be able to express a
notion of enthymematic entailment: entailments which are true if only a suppressed
true premises is stated explicitly. Whereas the entailment conditional → expresses
what A&B thought to be entailment itself, and that the enthymematic conditional only
expressed a second-rate version of entailment, both express what can be taken to be
consequence relations. At a first glance it seems that A&B only accepted relevant con-
sequence as being a proper consequence relation. The Entailment theorem, however,
shows that the relevant consequence relation and the Hilbertian one are interdefinable:
even though A&B quite forcefully rejected B → B to be a logical consequence of A,
in the sense of not being entailed by A, they quite happily accepted that B → B is
enthymematically entailed by A.
A&Bwrite of the Hilbertian notion of consequence in a rather disapproving way—
they talk of “Officers” adhering to the “Official” position for which
terms like “deduction,” “from,” “premiss,” “proof,” “hypothesis,” “valid,”
“demonstration,” “consequence,” and “argument” have virtually no connection
with the same terms as understood outside theOfficial context—even by theOffi-
27 See the “Appendix” for a proof.
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cer himself, when he takes off his uniform […]. (Anderson and Belnap 1975,
p. 258)
Seeing, however, as this “Official” notion of consequence shows up as a quite valid,
although enthymematically so, notion of logical consequence, one should not con-
clude that A&B sought to completely replace the Hilbertian notion of consequence
with their relevant one.28 I suggest, rather, that their view is more fruitfully viewed
as a pluralistic one: both the relevant and the Hilbert consequence relations apply
without restriction, according to A&B, irrespective of subject matter. Adhering to the
correctness of both amounts, then, to what Haack (1978, ch. 12) calls global pluralism.
Haack ties global pluralism to meaning variance. Hjortland (2013), however, argued
that there is one brand of pluralism about logical consequence, namely intra-theoretic
pluralism, which is not wedded to meaning variance, at least not to what he calls
B-type meaning variance. The basic idea is that B-type meaning variance can occur
when different logical systems assign different proof/truth-conditions to a connective
and thereby assign different meanings to it. If, however, two consequence relations are
definable over the same logical system, then such meaning variance would not occur:
“rather than simply the claim that there is more than one admissible consequence
relation, intra-theoretic pluralism combines more than one consequence relation in a
single logical theory (Hjortland 2013, p. 365). The examples that Hjortland mentions
include instances where the same proof system can be used to define more than one
consequence relation. This, we have seen, is also the case for the consequence relations
h and r for logics such asÆ: both are defined over the same proof system, namely
over the same set of axioms and rules.29 The cases that Hjortland mentions, how-
ever, requires commitment to the correctness of at least two ways of defining logical
consequence over a proof system seeing as he does not require that the consequence
relations be expressible via deduction theorems.30 In our case, however, the pluralism
is a free lunch as the commitment to both the Hilbertian consequence relation as well
as the relevant one can be economized to just one seeing as the one is expressible in
the other. Just as A&B incorporate relevant consequence and its enthymematic sib-
ling to account for valid arguments and “merely” enthymematically valid argument,
Hjortland states that
Philosophers who think that these systems contain useful consequence relations
for modelling different reasoning phenomena can use intra-theoretic pluralism
as a way to think about logical theories that combine the consequence relations
in a unified theory.
28 Or if they did, one should conclude that they shouldn’t have.
29 On the semantical side, Hjortland (2013, fn. 13) mentions global vs. logic semantic consequence in
Kripke semantics. Note, then, that the model-theoretic equivalent of h and r are in the case of logics
such asEt truth-preservance over the “normal” states—those which validate every logical axiom—whereas
the semantic equivalent ofr is truth-preservance over every state. The semantic equivalent ofh forEt[γ ],
however, is truth-preservance over the “base” world seeing as other “normal” states need not treat (γ ) as a
truth-preserving rule. For the semantics of Et and Et[γ ], see Routley et al. (1982, appendix 1).
30 One of the examples Hjortland mentions is the case where the consequence relations of the three-valued
logics K3 and LP are defined using the same three-sided sequent system. Neither of these logics have a
conditional for which a deduction theorem holds—K3 has in fact no logical theorems, whereas Beall et al.
(2013) showed that LP has no non-trivial way of defining a conditional for which modus ponens holds.
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Viewing A&B’s theory of entailment as a pluralistic take on logical consequence
yields a more liberal account of their view than their own iconoclastic presentation of
it at times seems to allow for. Note, then, that A&B did regard having an enthymematic
conditional with a deduction theorem relative to theHilbertian consequence relation as
something “one could hardly get along without” (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 259).
Should an A&B-inspired relevantist find that h does not correspond to an admissible
notion of logical consequence, then not only will A&B’s sine qua non criterion of
having an enthymematic conditional have to be given up, but the theory of entailment
has to be altered so as to make no such enthymematic conditional definable. In the case
of E this implies giving up not only the Ackermann constant, but also A&B’s favorite
wayof defining 	→using propositional quantifiers. Even if suchbe abnegated, however,
it seems that h may quite reasonably be argued to be expressible enthymematically
seeing as t can in fact be contextually defined so that (simplifying to the one-premise
case) {A} hE B if and only if ∅ hE A ∧ t′ → B, where t′ is the long conjunction of
every p → p for every propositional variable p occurring in the proof of B from A.31
Whatever may be the correct account of A&B’s views of these matters, however,
their selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment seem to commit them
to intra-theoretic pluralism about logical consequence. One may try to resist this by
sharpening and reevaluating the selection criteria. I suggest, however, that one rather
try to enjoy a free lunch.32
11 Summary
This paper has provided a systematic account of the selection criteria Anderson and
Belnap appealed to in giving what they argued to be a more adequate theory of entail-
ment. These criteria were categorized into three groups: the modal properties, the
relevance properties, and the properties pertaining to expressive strength. This paper
has shown that A&B’s original relevant logics, E and R, can be extended to become
strong and natural explosive logics. There are twoways of doing so: the first is to simply
addAckermann’s (γ )-rule—modus ponens for thematerial conditional, that is disjunc-
tive syllogism—as a primitive rule. This rule is admissible in both E and R, and so the
extension is conservative. Anderson and Belnap thought that adding (γ ) as a primitive
rulewould destroy the “nice” features of E. However, themodal features of E and quite
evidently retained. I’ve also shown that both of the relevance properties—the variable
sharing property and the use-criterion formalized as the Entailment theorem—are both
retained if (γ ) is added to either E or R. It was shown, however, that the addition does
affect the properties related to expressive strength. Adding (γ ) results in the failure of
the enthymematical deduction theorem for the defined conditional A ∧ t → B, where
t is the Ackermann constant. It was shown, however, that these logics have a different
enthymematic conditional for which a corresponding deduction theorem does hold.
31 This easily follows by studying the proof of the the enthymematical deduction theorem and applying
the results from Anderson and Belnap (1959).
32 I should note that this kind of pluralism has already been suggested for other relevant logics. Mares and
Paoli (2014) argue for a version of intra-theoretic pluralism applied to what is known as the internal and
external consequence relation of certain relevant logics. On this form of pluralism, see also Dicher (2020).
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However, the expressive criterion of rule normality, that every primitive rule should
correspond to a true entailment, fails, seeing as A ∧ (∼A ∨ B) → B cannot hold true
in any logic which satisfies the variable sharing property seeing as it would yield the
explosion axiom A ∧ ∼A → B.33
Even though the explosion axiom cannot be a general theorem of a relevant logic,
instances of it can be. The other way of extending E and R is to simply add t∧ f → A,
where f =d f ∼t. It was shown that the logics obtained by doing so—called Æ and
M—retain all of the properties appealed to by Anderson and Belnap in settling on
E and R. Æ and M, unlike E and R, however, have (γ ) as a derivable rule, and the
deduction theorem holds for the material conditional in both logics. The conclusion,
then, is that the material conditional cannot be ruled as being “no kind of conditional”
using the selection criteria Anderson and Belnap put forth. Not even, to once again
use A&B’s phrase, if we bend over backward and uphold not only the legitimacy of
the selection criteria, but also what these were thought to select, namely E and R.
At last it was suggested that Anderson and Belnap’s take on logical consequence
ought to be seen as what Hjortland (2013) calls intra-theoretic pluralism: I’ve argued
that Anderson and Belnap in fact end up having to endorse not only the relevant notion
of consequence, but also the Hilbertian notion of consequence seeing as the latter is
expressible as an enthymematical version of the former.
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Appendix: Enthymematic conditionals and deduction theorems
This appendix regards the three enthymematic conditionals 	→, ↪→ and , where
A 	→ B =d f A ∧ t → B
A ↪→ B =d f A ∧ t → f ∨ B
A  B =d f A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → f,
and the deduction theorems they support.
33 This, of course, assumes that → is provably transitive. There are non-transitive approaches to relevant
logics, although going further into this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Theorem 8 (t-enthymematic deduction theorem) Let L be any axiomatic extension of
Et for which the rule C h t → C is at least admissible, then




Proof The right to left direction is trivial since modus ponens holds for → and t is
a theorem. The other direction is an induction on the length of proof. To make the
presentation a bit friendlier, let A be the formula
∧
i≤n Ai ∧ t.
Assume that B1, . . . , Bn is the Hilbert proof of B from {A1, . . . , An}. Then if B j
is one of the Ai ’s, A → B j is obviously a logical theorem. If B j is an axiom, then
since {C} h t → C is admissible, we get that t → B j is a theorem, and therefore
that A → B j is too.
Now assume that B j is obtained from some Bk and Bl using adjunction (the β-rule).
We may then assume for inductive hypothesis that both A → Bk and A → Bl are
theorems. Since (A → Bk) ∧ (A → Bl) → (A → Bk ∧ Bl) is an instance of (Ax5),
we then get that A → Bk ∧ Bl is a theorem.
Assume lastly that B j is obtained from some Bk and Bl using modus ponens (the α-
rule), and let Bl therefore be the formula Bk → B j . From the inductive hypothesis that
both A → Bk and A → (Bk → B j ) are theorems, one gets A → (Bk ∧ (Bk → B j ))
using (Ax5). Since Bk ∧ (Bk → B j ) → B j is a logical theorem, we then get A → B j
which then ends the proof. 
Theorem 10 (t/f-enthymematic deduction theorem) Let L be any axiomatic extension
of Et[γ ] for which the rule {C} h t → C is at least admissible, then




Proof The right to left direction is as the above proof, only with an added application
of (γ ) in order to derive B from f ∨ B and t.
The left to right direction is in the base case also similar to the proof above. That
leaves only the three primitive rules. Again we let A be the formula
∧
i≤n Ai ∧ t.
In the case of adjunction the inductive hypothesis yields that both A → f∨ Bk and
A → f ∨ Bl are logical theorems. Using (Ax5) we then obtain that A → (f ∨ Bk) ∧
(f∨ Bl). (f∨ Bk)∧ (f∨ Bl) → f∨ (Bk ∧ Bl) is a logical theorem (use the distribution
axiom (Ax4)), and so A → f ∨ (Bk ∧ Bl) follows by transitivity.
In the case of modus ponens the inductive hypothesis yields that both A → f∨ Bk
and A → f ∨ (Bk → B j ) are theorems, and so, as in the adjunction-case, we get that
A → f∨ (Bk ∧ (Bk → B j )) is a theorem as well. Bk ∧ (Bk → B j ) → B j is a logical
theorem (use the contraction axiom (Ax7)), and so simple fiddling yields that so is
f ∨ (Bk ∧ (Bk → B j )) → f ∨ B j . Transitivity of →, then, yields A → f ∨ B j .
In the case of (γ ) the inductive hypothesis yields that both A → f ∨ Bk and
A → f∨ (∼Bk ∨ B j ) are theorems. Using Lemma 3 below, then, yields A → f∨ B j
which ends the proof. 
123
Synthese
Lemma 3 {A → f ∨ B, A → f ∨ (∼B ∨ C)} h
Et[γ ] A → f ∨ CProof
(1) A → f ∨ B assumption
(2) A → f ∨ (∼B ∨ C) assumption
(3) A → ∼B ∨ (f ∨ C) 2, fiddling
(4) A → (f ∨ B) ∧ (∼B ∨ (f ∨ C)) 1, 3, using Ax5
(5) (f ∨ B) ∧ (∼B ∨ (f ∨ C))
→ ((f ∨ B) ∧ ∼B) ∨ ((f ∨ B) ∧ (f ∨ C)) Ax4
(6) (f ∨ B) ∧ ∼B → (B ∧ ∼B) ∨ (f ∧ ∼B) Ax4 + fiddling
(7) B ∨ ∼B Ax12 + fiddling
(8) t → B ∨ ∼B 7, admissibility of t-rule Theorem 1&2
(9) B ∧ ∼B → f ∨ C 8, contraposition + fiddling
(10) f ∧ ∼B → f ∨ C Ax2&3 + fiddling
(11) (B ∧ ∼B) ∨ (f ∧ ∼B) → f ∨ C 9, 10, Ax6
(12) (f ∨ B) ∧ ∼B → f ∨ C 6, 11, transitivity
(13) (f ∨ B) ∧ (f ∨ C) → f ∨ C Ax3
(14) ((f ∨ B) ∧ ∼B) ∨ ((f ∨ B) ∧ (f ∨ C)) → f ∨ C 12, 13, Ax6
(15) A → f ∨ C 4, 5, 14, transitivity 
Lemma 4
(1)A ↪→ B hE A  B (2)A  B hE A ↪→ B
Proof (1)
(1) A ∧ t → f ∨ B assumption
(2) A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → A ∧ t Ax3 + fiddling
(3) A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → (f ∨ B) 1, 2, transitivity of →
(4) A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → ∼B Ax2 + Ax3
(5) A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → ∼B ∧ (f ∨ B) 3, 4, Ax5 + fiddling
(6) ∼B ∧ (f ∨ B) → f ∨ (B ∧ ∼B) Ax4 + fiddling
(7) B ∨ ∼B fiddling
(8) t → B ∨ ∼B 7, cf. Theorem 1
(9) B ∧ ∼B → f 8, fiddling
(10) f ∨ (B ∧ ∼B) → f 9, Ax6 + fiddling
(11) A ∧ ∼B ∧ t → f 5, 6, 10, transitivity of →
(2)
(1) (A ∧ ∼B ∧ t) → f assumption
(2) (A ∧ ∼B ∧ t) → (f ∨ B) 1, Ax2 + fiddling
(3) A ∧ B ∧ t → (f ∨ B) fiddling
(4) [((A ∧ t) ∧ B) ∨ ((A ∧ t) ∧ ∼B)] → (f ∨ B) 2, 3, Ax6 + fiddling
(5) [(A ∧ t) ∧ (B ∨ ∼B)] → [((A ∧ t) ∧ B) ∨ ((A ∧ t) ∧ ∼B)] Ax4
(6) t → B ∨ ∼B similar to (8) above
(7) A ∧ t → [(A ∧ t) ∧ (B ∨ ∼B)] 6, fiddling





{A1, . . . , An} hEt[γ ] B ⇐⇒ ∅ hEt[γ ]
∧




i≤n Ai ↪→ B
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